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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH

ZIONS SERVICE CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Pla~intiff arn.d Respondent,

-vs.-

Case
No. 9232

H. A. DANIELSON,
Defendarn.t a.nd Ap·pellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth in Appellant's Brief
is inadequate and in some respects misleading so that
Respondent desires to restate the facts in respect to the
matter now before the Court. Because of the designation
used by Appellant in referring to the parties as Plaintiff
and Defendant, Respondent (Plaintiff) will follow the
same procedure.
Plaintiff Corporation was incorporated in 1955 by
the Defendant and fourteen other masonry contractors
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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who had decided to form a corporation for the purpose of
conducting ''a . servic.e business fdr .·the ·masonry contract~rs; to do prelimin~ry work, farnishing ~stim~tes
and other information prerequisite of work." {Exh. 1)
Not only was Defendant one of the original incorporators,
but he w.as also one of the original Board of Directors,
and continued to serve in the capacity of a director in
Plaintiff Corporation until he· allegedly "resigned in the
Summer of 1958. (Exh. 2, R. 63)
Immediately after the incorporation, two estimators
were retained by the Company to furnish information to
the members regarding materials which would be required for jobs available for bidding. (Ex. 3) On January 3, 1956, at the second meeting of the Board of Directors of the Corporation, at which the Defendant was
present, it was ,unanimously .agr-eed that the members
would pay to the Corporation one per cent (1%) on all
jobs received by the members up to $10,000.00, two per
cent (2%) on jobs up to $25,000.00, and three per cent
(3%) on any job over $25,000.00. (Exh. 3)
The Defendant also seconded a motion (which was
likewise unanimously carried), that the fees by the members to the corporation ''be pro-rated and paid as the
progress payments are received on the contract.''
(Exh. 3)
Shortly after this meeting, a. Mr. Gerald Whitaker
was employed full time by the organization to prepare and
render the estimating service to the members. His duties
2
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included preparing materials, estimates and other data
on all known building jobs open for bids, and to furnish
the same to the individual members of the organization.
Such estimates were important as a basis for determining what material would be necessary in connection with
any bid submitted or as a proo£ or check against the figures compiled by the individual member himself. In addition to this service, Mr. Whitaker was also required to
furnish private estimates to any member seeking the
same, and otherwise to render assistance to individual
members when called upon to do so in respect to any job
in which such member was interested. (R. 40) Particularly, Mr. Whitaker testified as to such personalized services rendered to D.efendant. (R. 41-42) During the year
1956, Mr. Whitaker prepared 133 job estimates of which
approximately 6 were for individual members and the
balance of 127 were distributed to all of the members,
including the Defendant herein. (Exh. 4) (R. 44-46) In
the year 1957, 182 e,stimates were made with approximately the same number of private estimates, the balance being sent to the members, including the Defendant
herein. ( Exh. 5, R. 47)
During this period of time, Defendant obtained not
less than six jobs and by reason of the agreement entered into with the Plaintiff Corporation became obligated to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $5,288.00. (Exh. 7)
Defendant actually paid the specific amount called for by
the agreement on the first two jobs, (Exh. 2) and made
additional payments on other jobs for a total payment of
$1,662.00, leaving a balance owing to the Corporation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of $3,626.00 which he had not paid and for which legal
action was instituted. (Exh. 8)
There is a dispute in the testimony with respect to
certain conversations concerning his account. Mr. Whittaker testified that Defendant on several occasions acknowledged the obligation in full and made repeated promises to pay the same. Defendant, on the other hand,
admitted that certain of these conversations took place,
but denied that he knew how much was owing or that
he had agreed to pay the whole amount. (R. 123)
However, there is one conversation which is not disputed by Defendant and which is actually corroborated
by Defendant's witness. Mr. Whitaker testified that Defendant attended a meeting of the Board of Directors
held at. Harman's Cafe in October, 1958, at which time
the President of the Corporation requested Mr. Whitaker to advise Defendant of the amount of his bill. The
witness then did so, which bill included an additional item
not now claimed. Defendant objected to this item as having accrued after he had ''resigned'' and thereupon the
President instructed the witness to delete such item
from the bill. As to the balance thereof, Defendant ''said
he wo.uld pay it, but he \Yanted equal treatment that everybody else got. ' ' ( R. 63) As to \Yhat took place at Harman's Cafe on the occasion referred to by 1\Ir. Whitaker,
Defendant's witness, Calvin N. Ashton, testified:
''A. To my recollection the conversation concerned money o\\Ted by Mr. Danielson, the
specific amount being read to him, ho\v much
he was owing, and his agreement to pay con4
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ditioned upon the fact that all members owing
pay all items - the same fee that he had
been charged.'' ( R. 118)
The fees charged all members were computed on
the basis of the fee schedule set up in the minutes of the
Board (Exh. 3). The members were to report their jobs
at the monthly meetings which were held. If the member
reported what he owed, that was accepted unless it appeared to be contrary to the information available. If
a member failed to report the amount owing, Mr. Whitaker had to make the computation himself from the information available to him using the same fee schedule, and
leave it up to the member to question the amount if there
was a dispute. Mr. Whitaker testified that he had never
received any objection from the Defendant herein. (R.
49, 50)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Appellant has listed five points of alleged error in
connection with the judgment of the lower court. The
first two points involve the question of whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that an agreement
existed between the corporate Plaintiff and the individual
Defendant. Point III alleges that the Plaintiff breached
the agreement, if any, between the parties, and therefore
cannot recover. Point IV sets out an alleged defense that
the agreement violates the Statute of Frauds. Finally,
Point V urges that the agreement is in violation of Section 50-1-6 U. C. A. 1953, as amended, and is void and
unenforceable a.s being against public policy in that it is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in restraint of. trade. Plaintiff will discuss the first three
points together and the other individual points separately
under the following headings :
I. Sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding
of the Court as to the obligation of the Defendant.
II. Is Plaintiff precluded from recovery by reason
of the provisions of Section 25-5-4, U. C. A. 1953 (commonly referred to as the Statute of Frauds) ~
III. Is the alleged agreement against public policy
and in violation of Section 50-1-6, U. C. A. 1953, as
amended, and therefore void and unenforceable as an
unlawful restraint of trade~
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF THE COURT AS TO
THE OBLIGATION OF THE DEFENDANT.
The graveman of Plaintiff's Complaint against the
Defendant in this action is set forth in the pre-trial order
to the effect that ''the Plaintiff sues the Defendant for
services rendered of the agreed and reasonable value of
$3,626.00." (R. 8) Although the Plaintiff claims that the
Defendant agreed to pay a specific sum for the services
rendered to Defendant by Plaintiff, the Plaintiff nevertheless also seeks to recover on a quantum merut basis.
The Court determined that there was a contract 'Yhereby
6
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Defendant agreed to pay a specific sum for the services
rendered to him by the Corporation but also found that
the reasonable value of the services rendered was ''not
less than $7,000.00." (R. 148, 149)
In arguing that there was no contract between the
Plaintiff Corporation and Defendant, Defendant entirely
overlooks the basic elements of a contract. A contract
may be expressed by the statements, or implied from the
conduct and actions of the parties. A good definition of
express and implied contracts is contained in 12 Am. Jur.,
''CONTRACTS,'' Sect. 4, p. 498, as follows:
'' 4. ExPRESS AND IMPLIED CoNTRACTs. Contracts are express or implied. Implied contracts
are implied in fact or in law. Contracts are express when their terms are stated by the parties.
They are often said to be implied when their terms
are not so stated. Contracts implied in fact are
inferred from the facts and circumstances of the
case, and are not formally or explicitly stated in
words. It is often said that the only difference between an express· contract a.nd a contract implied
in fact is that in the former the parties arrive at
their agreement by words, whether oral or written,
sealed or unsealed, while in the latter, their agreement is arrived a.t by a consideration of their acts
an.d conduct, a;n.d that in both of these cases there
is, in fact, a contract existing between the parties,
the only difference being in the character of evidence necessary to establish it. In other words, in
an express contract all the terms and conditions
are expressed between the parties, while in an implied contract, some one or more of the terms and
conditions are implied from the conduct of the
parties. The source of the obligation of express
contracts and contracts implied in fact is the manSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ifested intention of the parties. An implied contract between two parties is only raised when the
facts are such that an intent may fairly be inferred
on their part to make such a contract. All the pertinent circumstances must be taken into consideration.'' (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 goes on to illustrate :
''Many illustrations of contracts implied in
fact may be given. Where a person performs services, furnishes property, or expends money for
another at the other's request and there is no express agreement as to compensation, a promise
to pay the reasonable value of the services or property or to reimburse for money expended may
properly be implied where the circumstances warrant such an inference, but such a promise cannot
properly be implied where the circumstances do
not warrant an inference of such a promise. A
promise will not be inferred where there are facts
wholly inconsistent with the contract to be implied. Generally, there is an implication of a
promise to pay for valuable services rendered with
the knowledge and approval of the recipient, in
the absence of a showing to the contrary.''
The Restatement on the Law of Contracts, Vol. 1,
Sec. 5 states :
''A promise in a contract must be stated in such
words either oral or \Yritten, or must be inferred
wholly or partly from such conduct, as justifies
the promise in understanding that the promisor
intended to make a promise.''
In the comment following, the Restatement adds:
''Contracts are often spoken of as express or
implied. The distinction involves, however, no dif8
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ference in legal effect, but lies merely in the mode
of manifesting assent.''
Cases which have discussed the difference between
express and implied contracts and affirmed the principle
that the difference lies merely with the manner of proof
are as follows :

W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, et al., 40 C. A. 2d 778, 256 P.
2d 947; Fred K. Caron, v. Parley G. Andrew, 133 C. A.
2d 412, 284, P. 2d 550. In the latter case the Court made
the following observation:
'' 'It is generally held that the existence of an
implied contract is usually a question of fact for
the trial court. Where evidence is conflicting or
where reasonable conflicting inferences may be
drawn from evidence which is not in conflict, a
question of fact is presented for decision of the
trial court.
*
* **
*
*
" 'Further, on appeal we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment.' Medina v. Van Camp Sea Food Co., 75 C. A. 2d 551,
556, 171 p. 2d 445, 448. ' '

Likewise, Defendant has failed to recognize the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts. A unilateral contract is defined by the Restatement of Contracts as one "in which no promisor receives a promise as
consideration for his promise." (Ibid., Vol. 1, Sec. 12)
In the Comment to this section, the Restatement goes
on to state:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"a. In a unilateral contract the exchange for
the promise is something other than a promise ;
in a bilateral contract promises are exchanged for
one another.
''b. ·There must always be at least two parties
to a contract, whether unilateral or bilateral, and
there must usually be an expression or assent by
each. In many cases, however, a promise becomes
a contract even though no return promise is made
by the promisee. In such cases the legal duty is
unilateral, resting on the promisor alone. The correlative legal right is also unilateral, being possessed by the promisee alone. The statement often
ma.de that unless both parties are bound neither is
bound is quite erroneous, as a universal state·
ment." (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the Court found that one of the
purposes for which Plaintiff Corporation was formed
"was to furnish to its members and stockholders material
analyses or quantity surveys on projects open to bid by
such members." (R. 148)
The Court likewise found that ''in consideration of
the agreement of the corporation to furnish such services to him and in consideration of the agreement of the
other members of the corporation so to do, Defendant
agreed to pay to the Plaintiff Corporation in cash.... ''
(R. 148)
The above findings and all others are adequately supported by the evidence in this case. In fact, there is no
dispute with respect to the above items in the record.
When Defendant was asked by his counsel if he had ever

10
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entered into any agreement with the Corporation, he
answered:
''Well, I don't know just what you mean by
that. I was maybe, you might say, one of the original incorporators, but no agreement.'' (R. 122)
When called upon further to explain the matter, he
said that he did not sign a formal agreement. (R. 122)
Defendant contends in his brief that the Corporation
did not charge the members at the same rate. However,
this is not in accordance with the evidence. It is true that
counsel for Defendant referred to three different occasions where a specific amount was charged by the Corporation to a member, but there is no evidence as to the
amount owing except by innuendo. When asked whether
a certain sum was the amount of the bid, Mr. Whitaker
testified that he did not know (R. 97) but that the amount
charged was to his best judgment, the amount owing on
the basis of the fee schedule. (R. 50) In one instance he
said an error may have been made if the amount of the
bid was as stated by counsel. (R. 94) However, the record
does not show what the amount of the bid was and therefore, we cannot say whether an error was made by the
computor or not.
Defendant likewise claims that the Corporation
''could have, and did, fail to supply Defendant with many
of the bids.'' This is not in accordance with the evidence. The witness Whitaker testified that the bids were
either delivered to Danielson personally, or that they
were mailed to him, except the bids which were furnished
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to individual members as a matter of personal information to them in accordance with the instructions which
he had from the Board of Directors. (R. 45) Defendant
never denied that he received the bids which the witness
for the Plaintiff testified were prepared and mailed to
the members. In fact, when asked by his counsel as to how
many estimates he received, Defendant testified he didn't
know. (R. 128) The most that c~n be said for Defendant's position is that he testified that he told the Board
of Directors he would not pay the money he owed as long
as a certain officer handled the funds. The record shows
that this man was released within a few months after the
incorporation and thereafter the Defendant proceeded
to pay his initial subscription and some of the fees owing.
Unfortunately, he did not pay all that he owed.
Defendant further attempts to avoid liability in this
matter on the ground that in addition to the obligation to
furnish services by way of materials estimates, the Corporation was to invest its surplus funds. The witness
Whitaker, however, testified :
'' To make an investment our Board of Directors felt that we should have a consistent and continuing income, and eYery time 'Ye found an
investment that looked good to us, 'Ye figured 'Ye
had to have money to go into it, and so 've were
struggling along saYing money.'' (R. 102)
Perhaps, if this Defendant had paid the amount
owing by him at the time it 'Yas due and payable, there
may have been funds available for inYestment. In any
event, the Corporation would not be required to inYest its
12
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funds if it appeared necessary to have them on hand to
pay its current obligations.
The fact that there was not sufficient funds to make
any investments also negatives Defendant's claim that
the charges were excessive for the services rendered. Defendant points to no testimony in the record to the effect
that any part of the consideration for the fee charged
by the Corporation was the investment of funds. Obviously, any oganiza.tion would want to invest any surplus
funds rather than to leave them idle, but would have to
have funds before it could invest them.

PoiNT

II

IS PLAINTIFF PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERY BY REASON OF THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 25-5-4, U. C. A. 1953 (COMMONLY
REFERRED TO AS THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS)~

In presenting the argument that the agreement between the parties was in violation of Section 25-5-4,
U. C. A. 1953, in that the agreement was not in writing,
Defendant actually ignores the provisions of the statute
which reads as follows :
''In the following cases, every agreement shall
be void unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith :
'' 1. Every agreement that by its term.s is not
to be performed within one year from the making
thereof.'' (Emphasis supplied)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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By the very terms of the statute, the agreement must
specifically provide that it is not to be performed within
the provisions thereof. Our Court early held in the case
of Johnson v. Johnson, 31 Utah 408, 88 Pac. 230, that a
contract by a purchaser of land to pay the seller ''for
life, one-half of the crops produced on lands'' was not
within the above provision since death might occur
within one year. Likewise, the Restatement of Contracts
in interpreting a similar phrase states the rule to be:
''The words 'cannot be fully performed' must
be taken literally. The fact that performance within a year is entirely improbable or not expected
by the parties, does not bring the contract within
this statute.'' (Sec. 198, Comment b.)
In the instant case, the witness Whitaker testified
that "Any member of the corporation is free to leave
the corporation ,if he will bring his stock into us and make
it known that he wants to leave. No one has ever done
it.'' (R. 103)
Based upon the foregoing, and other evidence in the
case, the Court found. that the agreement between the
parties ''was terminable by either party at any time,''
(R. 149) so that there is no basis for Defendant's contention that the contract in question was in violation of
the Statute of Frauds.
Even if the contract had been within the Statute
of Frauds, the corporation Plaintiff would be entitled to
recover the reasonable value of the services rendered, and
which the Court found to be in excess of the amount sued
14
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for. In the case of Fabian.v. Wasatch Orchard Co., (1912)
41 Utah 404, 125 Pac. 860, the Court held a contract of
employment to be within the Statute of Frauds but nevertheless went on to state that the Plaintiff was entitled to
recover the reasonable value of the services rendered
prior to the contract being repudiated by the other party.
A cursory reading of the cases cited by Defendant
discloses that none of them are applicable, either to the
facts of this case, or the law of this jurisdiction in respect
thereto.
PoiNT III
IS THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT AGAINST
PUBLIC POLICY AND IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 50-1-6, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED,
AND THEREFORE VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS AN UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT OF
TRADE~

The Defendant asserts that the agreement between
the Plaintiff corporation and its masonry contractor
stockholders is in violation of public policy and violative
of Section 50-1-6 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in that
it is a restraint of trade.
He thereby raises two basic questions, the first of
these is whether or not the agreement is violative of
Utah's Little Sherman Act as contained in Title 50 of the
Utah Code. Secondly, if it be found that it is not a violation of Utah's Little Sherman Act, the further question
arises as to whether it is in violation of a broader concept
of public policy than is presented by this Statute.
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It would seem that the best way to dispose of the
first of these questions -that of the Sherman Act Doctrine - would be to refer to the Supreme Court of the
United States in the cases which it has handed down in
relation to trade association activities. Perhaps one of
the outstanding decisions rendered on this problem was
handed down in the case of Maple Flooring MOJJVUfactur·
ers Association v. U rvited States (1925) 268 U. S. 563, 45
S. C. 578. In that case the Maple Flooring Association
had been enjoined by the district court from continuing
their activities. These activities consisted of a computation and distribution among the members of the association of the average cost to association members of all dimensions and grades of flooring, the compilation and
distribution among members of a booklet showing freight
rates, a gathering of statistics showing the quantity and
kind of flooring sold and the prices received by the recording members, and the amount of stock on hand. The
Supreme Court in reversing the decree of the district
court, held that the activities of the association were not
in restraint of trade :

,

''It is the consensus of opinion of economists
and of many of the most important agencies of
government that the public interest is served by
the gathering and dissemination, in the rightist
possible manner, of information with respect to
the production and distribution, costs and prices
in actual sales, of market commodities because the
making available of such information tends to stabilize trade and industry, to produce fairer price
levels and to avoid the waste which inevitably attends the unintelligent conduct of econo1nic enter·
prise. Free competition means a free and open
16
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market among both buyers and sellers for the sale
and distribution of commodities. Competition
does not become less free merely because the conduct of commercial operations becomes more intelligent through the free distribution of knowledge
of a.ll the essential factors entering into the commercial tra;n.saction. General knowledge that there
is an accumulation of surplus of any market commodity would undoubtedly tend to diminish production, but the dissemination of tha.t information cannot in itself be said to be restraint upon
commerce in any legal sense. The manufacturer is
free to produce, but produce and business foresight based on that knowledge influences free
choice in favor of more limited production. Restraint upon free competition begins w·h en improper use is made of that informa.tion to a;ny conserted action of those w·ho buy and sell.
"It is not the purpose or the intent of the Sherma.n Anti-Trust La;w to inhibit the intelligent
conduct of busin,ess operation, nor do we conceive
that its purpose wa-s to supp·r ess such influences
that might affect the op-eration of inter-stale commerce through the application to them of the individual in.telligence of those en,g aged in commerce,
enlightened by accura.te information as to the
essential elements of the economics of a trade or
business, however gathered or disseminated. Persons who unite in gathering and disseminating information in trade journals and statistical reports
on industry, who gather and publish statistics as
to the amount of production of commodities in
interstate commerce, and who report market
prices, are not engaged in unlawful conspiracies
in restraint of trade merely because the ultimate
result of their efforts may be to stabilize prices or
limit production through a better understanding
of economic laws and a more general ability to
conform to them, for the simple reason that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Shermarn Law neither repeals economic laws nor
prohibits the gathering and · dissemination of
information. Sellers of a;ny com.modity who guide
the daily conduct of their business on the basis of
market reports would hardly be deemed to be co~
spirator s engaged in restraint of interstate commerce. They wDuld not be any more so merely because they become stockholders in a corporation or
joint owners of a trade journal, engaged in the
business of compiling an.d publishing such reports." (Emphasis supplied)
Certainly the awareness of the Supreme Court as
to the economics of business conduct should carry greater
weight than does the apparent lack of understanding expressed by the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of
Master Builders Association of Kansas v. Carson (1931)
132 Kan. 606, 296 Pac. 693, which is stressed by the Defendant in his Brief. The Kansas Court in that case, while
striking down a contract distinguishable from the present
one in several factors to be taken up later, used the following language :
''There cannot be this competition between
contractors when all of them bidding on a certain
job derive a large share of their information and
their pro biding (sic) engineering service from the
same course. The engineers and other employees
of the appellant may be ever so successful and
ever so competent and efficient, but, if all the bidders of a certain job have secured the same service
of that kind, from where is going to come the competition 1 The spirit of this type of legislation is
that all bidders will strive in all departments of
their work to outdo the others that are in the
same field. This feature of the contracting business is just as important to a successful contractor

18
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as the business of actually doing the work, and
the spirit of the statutes is that each one will strive
to outdo the other by shrewder engineering work,
by closer observation of local labor conditions, by
closer figuring on the places from where raw materials may be obtained, freight rates, and all the
other myriad problems which enter into the successful handling of a bid for any job. Now, if this
Court should approve a contract such as the one
sued on here, the public would lose much of the
benefit to be derived from this competition between contractors. In fact, about the only thing
that makes competition between contractors would
be gone.''
The Kansas Court here assumes that it is to the
benefit to the public that contractors make mistakes in
bidding. Certainly there is no restraint in trade if all the',
contractors were to be given the exact figure of X number
of bricks and X hundred pounds of mortar which it would
take to erect a building. Anyone who would deprive them
of this right would say that the public is better off when
some unsuspecting, perhaps negligent, contractor submits a bid mistakenly figuring only half the number of
bricks actually required for the job. Certainly, this is
not the intent nor purpose of competitive bidding. In
fact, a review of cases will indicate that if the contractor
makes a great mistake in this area that he will be relieved from his competitive bid. The recent Utah case
State v. Union Construction Co. (1959) 9 Utah 107, 339
P. 2d 421 strongly bears this out. In that case a road
contractor submitted a bid for road work in the southern
part of the state. He made a mistake as to the direction
in which the road would go and so submitted a bid of
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some $29,000.00 less than it should have been. The State
of Utah accepted his bid, he refused to carry it out and
sued the State· to recover the amount of bid bonds he had
put up. The court in allowing him to recover stated that
an error such as he made should be excused and he should
not be held to his contract.
In view of the doctrine set forth in that case, a group
of contractors unable to hire individually the type of competent, efficient service needed to ascertain the exact
amount of materials required for a job are well advised
to pool their efforts to gain certainty. They can then
decide individually what they, as an efficient operating
enterprise with the type of machinery they use, the type
of men they have working for them, and the amount of
money they need for overhead, need to perform that job.
Certainly the presentment to all contractors of the
exact amount of materials that will go into a job operates
for the benefit of the public and not to its disadvantage.
We re-emphasize the Supreme Court's language that
"comp-etition does not become less free merely because
the conduct of commercial operations becomes more
intelligent through the free distribution of knowledge
of all essential factors entering into the commercial
trams action.''
Where no attempt is made to limit productioll, fix
prices, or control commodities, contracts are generally
valid. Certainly the sure knowledge of the amount of
materials to go into a job does not fix the price nor control production of the commodity. Therefore, Defend20
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ant's claim that the agreement with Plaintiff Corporation violates Section 50-1-1, U. C. A. 1953, as amended,
is not well founded.
Defendant's second point- that based upon a broad
general coneept of ''public policy'' - is likewise untenable. Perhaps to tie this problem down to somewhat of
a more concrete situation we might again quote from the
Supreme Court of the United States:
''Public policy is to be ascertained by reference
to the laws and legal precedents and not from general consideration of supposed public interest.
There must be found definite indications in the
laws of the sovereignty to justify the invalidation
of a contract as contrary to public policy.'' (Muschany v. U. S., 324 U.S. 49)
The public policy is to be found in the Constitution
and laws and decisions of the Courts, and when the Court
is asked to declare a contract void as being against public policy, to justify sustaining the defense, the line of
that policy must be clear and distinct. United States v.
Grace Evangelical Church of South Providence Ridge,
137 F. 2d 460.
Turning to something a little closer to home in this
regard we find the Supreme Court of Utah in the case
of Fra.iley v. McGarry (1949) 116 Utah 504, 211 P. 2d
840, stating as follows :
''There ean be no doubt concerning the duty of
this court to invalidate contracts which have a
tendency to be injurious to the public welfare ...
Although the legislature has given formal expresSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sion to this principle, the principle· would be
equally true in the absence of statute. While contract obligations in controven.tion of public policy
may ordina.rily be avoided by the contracting p·ar·
ties, the law favors the right of men of full age and
competent understanding to contract freely and
before this right is denied on. the grounds of pub·
lie policy, there must be a showing free from doubt
tha.t the contra.ct is against public policy and not
merely one which has turned out unfortunately
for one pa.rty or one that was imprudently made.
If by any reasonable construction the contract coo
be declared lawful and not in contravention of public policy, it is our duty to so interpret it." (Emphasis supplied)
In support of the claim that the agreement is against
public policy, Plaintiff relies upon the general statements
appearing in Williston on Contracts and the Restatement
of the Law, Contracts. The same principle is enunciated
by both authorities to the effect that ''a bargain not to
bid a.t an auction, or any public competion, having as its
p·rimary object to stifle competition, is illegal.'' (Restatement of the Law, Con.tracts, Vol. 2, Sec. 517. See also,
Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 5, Sec.
1663).
We desire to point out to the Court the basic requirement that the primary object must be to stifle competition. We have carefully reviewed and analyzed the above
statements and the cases cited by Defendant which purport to apply this principle of la": to situations such as
are now before the Court. Let us start 'vith the illustration given by the Restatement that "'"here "A, B, C, and
22
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D, building contractors, -~rgu~. with another to form the
X association and that in future bids for the award of
building contracts the successful bidder shall pay to the
X association 2 per cent of the gross amount of the price
fixed in the contract awarded'' the agreement is void.
In this illustration the only object of the agreement
would be to stifle competition by sharing with each other
the fruits of the successful bid. However, that is not
the situation before this Court in the instant matter
where the purpose of the fee is to pay for the services
being rendered to the individual by the Corporation.
That this is a valid distinction is aptly demonstrated
by the Court's comments in the case of Associated W isconsin Contractors v. Lathers, 235 Wis. 14, 291 N.W.
770, cited by Defendant on page 16 of his brief. The
Court stated there was "no allegation of facts that take
the case out from under the rule.'' There no services
were rendered but a mere ''pool'' of money was created
for the members. Such also was the situation in the case
of lJ!la.ster Builders Association of Kansas v. Carson,
supra. In that case the fee was in fact a ''kick back,''
one-half of which went to the next five low bidders and
the balance into the association ''pool.'' The Court there
found that the effect of the agreement would ''naturally
result in an increase in the costs of the school building."
No one can deny the logic of the conclusion reached
by the Court under the facts in that case. However, the
case overlooks the basic and controlling fact that if the
contractor receives a service and benefit from the inforSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mation furnished him, in adding this amount to his bid
he is doing nothing different from what literally hundreds
upon thousands of contractors do in submitting any bid.
Submitting an estimate of what they feel it will cost them
to do the job plus what they figure is a fair profit. If they
have contracted to buy materials from ''X'' Company for
$2,000.00 and have contracted to pay for information received, which information was applied and used in the
figuring of that job, both must be added into the price bid
for the contract. But in both instances the amount added
to the contract is for a necessary and justifiable expense
entered into for the purpose of fulfilling the obligation of
the contract.
The case of Constructors Association v. Seeds (1949),
142 Pa. Sup. 59, 15 A. 2d 467, also relied on by Defendant, discusses all of the cases cited in his Brief and points
out the factors which obviously induced the courts in
those cases to hold the several contracts void as against
public policy. In the Constructors Association Case, the
by-laws of the Association provided that each member
should pay to the Association a certain percentage of each
contract secured. ''This percentage, one-half of one per
cent, shall be included in any estimates for ne\Y work
taken ... '' No provision was made for any services and
no services were rendered by the Association for
such dues. These were merely dues to belong to the
organization.
The court pointed out that the same situation prevailed in the case of Ken.tucky Association v. TTTilliams,
24
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213 Ky 167, 280 S.W. 937, and the Master Builders Association Case, supra, relied upon by Defendant. After discussing these cases and the rule enunciated in the Restate·ment of the La.w, Contracts, Sec. 517, the court, as the
basis for determining the contract to be against public
policy, concluded:
''It seems quite apparent that such a by-law
has a direct tendency to injure the public and
thus affect competitive bidding. The percentage
charged all members is obviously not a pa.yment in
the form of dues for services rendered by the asso·ciation, but gives to such members an interest in
the contract as it results in making a distribution
to them through the association of a portion of
the contract price.'' (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case the facts establish, and the lower
Court found, that the services rendered by the Plaintiff Corporation were substantially greater in value than
what Defendant is required to pay.
Defendant argues that the cost of this service must
be added to the bid submitted by a contractor. Obviously,
any cost of operation must be absorbed by the contractor
out of the moneys received by him for the work done or
the contractor would go broke. If the contractor pays for
10 or 15 estimates without being successful in either of
such bids, he will have to add the cost thereof to the next
bid or bids in order to break even. Every bid must
contain a sufficient margin to allow for contingencies,
overhead costs when no work is being performed, taxes,
accounting, insurance, legal expense, and a reasonable
profit to the contractor. However, if the bid is not low
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enough to be competitive with other contractors - who
are not members ·of the Plaintiff Corporation (and we
must keep in mind that there are less than 15 masonry
contractors who belong to Plaintiff Corporation out of
perhaps a hundred or more licensed in this state) some
other contractor will walk off with the contract.
Defendant did not produce any evidence at the trial
which would show or .tend to show either ( 1) that the
charges made for the services rendered were disproportionate or excessive; or ( 2) that the effect of the agreement would be to increase cost of construction in the
industry or stifle competition.
Surely, these small masonry contractors may band
together to save costs and expenses by jointly hiring an
estimator and a computet without being subject to the
claim that such has as its p·rimary object the stifling of
competition or the increasing of the cost of construction.
Many large general contracting firms may have sufficient
business to hire a full-time estimator or pay a ''retainer''
to a professional person. Is it any greater sin for a number of small sub-contractors such as masonry workers to
share the cost of such service and pay on a contingent
basis - that is only when such sub-contractor receives a
job out of which he will have income with which to pay his
bills~

It is also of interest to note that in the Constructors
Associ.ation Case, supra, the Court ruled that the by-law
in question ''constitutes the agreement between the Association and its members and is subject to the same rules
26
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of construction as a written contract signed by all the
parties.''
The court further held :
"Like all by-laws it shall be deemed legal
unless manifestly it tends to injure the public in
some way.''
While there has been services rendered by the corporate organization or entity as a basis for the fees or
assessments levied against the members, the courts have
been uniform in holding that the contract or agreement
to pay such fees or charges is not against public policy.
See, Electrical Con-tractors Associa.tion of the City of
Chicago v. A. S. Schrulma;n Electric Company, (1945) 324
Ill. App. 28, 57 N.E. 2d 320; aff'd. 391 Ill. 333, 63 N.E.
2d 392, and annotated in 161 A.L.R. 787. The court in
that case held that where services rendered by an association of electrical contractors to its members are legal
in their purpose and intent the mere fact that a by-law
affixed the dues of a member upon a sliding scale proportionate to the amount of business done by the members
would not make that by-law pertaining to the dues violative of public policy on the theory that such arrangement gave each member an interest in business of the
other members or as tending to suppress competition.
The A.L.R. annotation on that case considers both sides
of the question as to whether this type of an association
contract should be declared violative of public policy.
161 A.L.R. 787.
In Griffiths & Sprague Stevedore Co. v. Waterfront
Emp. Ass'n of Pacific Coast (C. A. 9) 162 Fed. 2d 1017,
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the Court of Appeals expressly rejected the holding of
the Kansas Court in the Carson Case, supra. In the
Griffiths & Sp·rague Stevedore Co. Case, the Appellee
brought an action against Appellant to collect the sum of
$74,471.04 owing as "dues" for the years 1943 and 1944.
The evidence showed that Appellant had paid the dues
for the two preceding years without question. The dues
against member organizations were assessed on the basis
of 2Y2 cents per ton on all offshore and intercoastal cargo
harndled by each member, payable at the end of each
month.
In affirming the decision of the trial court which
granted judgment to the Association, the Court of
Appeals stated:
''Appellant contends that 'Appellee's claim is
contrary to public policy and therefore void.'
Appellee's claim is for the unpaid assessments
mentioned above. These assessments were levied
by the resolution mentioned above. Assessments
levied by the resolution were levied to cover the
cost of services performed by appellee for its
members. Services so performed by appellee w·ere
needed by its members in handling offshore and
intercoastal cargo, including Ar1ny cargo." (Emphasis added)

In the instant matter, it is the belief of the Plaintiff
that the contract was entered into for the purpose of
gaining a very necessary and vital element \vhich would
enter into the bidding for masonry contracts. The information ,gained through Plaintiff Corporation enabled
the contractors to be more assured of the correctness of
28
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their bid. The amount paid for this service is actually
somewhat nominal in effect and enables the contractor
to proceed with confidence and assuredness that his bid
includes an accurate computation of the actual amount
of material which will go into the job. It enables him to
actually lower his bid because he need not add any percentage for risk calculation.
The comment contained in the annotation in 161
A.L.R. appears particularly appropriate. We quote:
"It is submitted that when a court holds, as
a matter of law and without supporting evidence,
that the payment of dues proportioned to business
done has a tendency to raise prices, it ignores the
facts. It ignores the probability that the association gives the dues-payer his money's worth, and
that it can perform services which actually result
in reduced prices to the public. It assumes that
businessmen are so stupid that they spend
$70,000,000 a year for association dues without
receiving corresponding benefits.
''Let us assume the common case where one
hundred or more manufacturers or other businessmen in the same field must sell on credit. If
there is no central credit agency, each manufacturer must obtain his own information independently; but if there is an association which maintains a central credit agency the manufacturers
may reduce the expense of one hundred credit
departments. The dues paid for such a service
would not ordinarily equal the expense to the individual of maintaining his own investigation service. And the central agency might be so much
more efficient than his own service that it would
enable him to avoid credit risks which his own
limited facilities would not detect. There is nothSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing in such a reduction of expenses and losses
which woul4 increase prices to the public.''

Def~ndant attempts to distinguish the above ·cases
relied upon by Plaintiff by stating that those cases involved "non-profit" organizations. We cannot see how
the form of the corporate entity makes any difference.
In either event the members own the assets of the organization and upon liquidation are paid whatever reserves
or surpluses are accumulated. In fact, during the time
the organization continues to exist, if a sufficient undivided surplus is accumulated,_ it may be paid out in the
form of dividends to stockholders or members in either
case or it may be used up by reducing the fees or charges
made.
The intent and _purpose of the corporate entity is to
be determined from the purposes declared in the Articles
regardless of the 'form; and in the present instance the
Articles specifically provide that the purpose for which
the corporation was formed was first "to provide a service business for the masonry contractors.''
Defendant claims there are three conditions which
result from the agreement involved here and which were
present in the Master Builders Association Case, supra:
( 1) The contractor is likely to add the costs of the
service to the contract. The Court ''Till note that Defendant concedes that it is a cost of service 'vith 'vhich we are
here involved. In the cases relied on by Defendant there
were no serv~ces rendered for the alleged dues. Also,
30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the cost of all services rendered to a contractor in his
business must be added in somewhere in his bid or he will
not be able to break even in his business.
(2) Those who did not give any service would benefit
in the winning contractor's business. In the Kansas Case
each of the next 5 lowest bidders received a share of the
successful bidder's bid. This was and is against public
policy. But in the instant case only the ·corporation receives anything from the successful bidder and this is in
payment of the services being continuously rendered by
the corporation. No individual member or stockholder
profits in any way except that all receive the same service and some may pay more than others because of having
more business. It is a little like saying that an unsuccessful litigant whose attorney represents him on a contingent basis shares in the recovery of a successful litigant because the latter apparently pays the fees of the
attorney while the former does not. Nevertheless such a
contract is not against public policy and void.
( 3) The service ''would be an exceptionally high
priced source.'' Defendant refers to the deposition of Mr.
Whitaker on this point as well as elsewhere in his Brief.
It must be remembered that the deposition was never read
in court and is not a part of the record on appeal. However, the references to the testimony are not accurate.
The witness Whitaker testified that a reasonable cost of
giving each of the estimates to Defendant would have
been between $40.00 to $50.00 where the estimates were
being distributed on a volume basis. (R. 89) Since DeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fendant received in excess of 250 of these estimates during
the period he was active the reasonable cost to him of such
service was in excess of $7,500.00. The Court actually
found the reasonable value of the service to be not more
than $7,000.00. (Finding No. 6, R. 149)
We again emphasize, as did the Court in the Circuit
Court in the Griffiths & Sprague Stevedore Co. Case,
supra, that any member could withdraw whenever he
chose to do so and save himself the cost of the services if
he felt they were not adequate or the cost therefor was
excessive. Defendant in this case did cease to be active;
and although he did not formally resign the Plaintiff Corporation cancelled any obligation to pay for the services
thereafter rendered to him even though it had no notice
of his resignation.
SUMMARY
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that the Findings of the lower court in this case are amply supported
by the evidence and that under the facts the agreement
of the Defendant to pay for the services rendered to him
by the Plaintiff Corporation does not have as its primary object the stifling of competition or the increasing
of the cost of construction and is therefore not illegal
as a restraint of trade.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
NIELSEN AND CONDER
Attorneys for Respondent
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